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TRANSNATIONAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
NETWORKS AND DOMESTIC REGULATORY 
ACTION 
Xun Cao 
Department of Political Science 
Penn State University 
Hugh Ward 
Department of Government 
University of Essex 
Transnational climate governance (TCG) creates networks between countries as governments 
and other organizations enter joint arrangements to further their interests. We argue that actors 
build TCG, rather than focusing on promoting change at the domestic level, when this is a more 
efficient way of using their limited resources than lobbying to increase the level of domestic 
regulation. Based on standard micro-economic theory, we show that actors will respond to higher 
existing levels of domestic regulation by participating more in TCG, because the existence of 
such domestic legislation frees up resources for them to use in other ways, including activities at 
the transnational level. We carry out an empirical test based on the strength of the network ties 
between countries formed by TCG. Results support our main hypothesis on the positive 
relationship between a country’s level of domestic policy output and its participation in TCGs, 
suggesting that national policies and TCGs are more complements than substitutes as instruments 
to address global climate change. 
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Transnational climate governance (TCG) creates networks between countries as governments 
and other organizations enter joint arrangements to further their interests. Some of these 
arrangements are sponsored by, or strongly steered by, the actions of states or international 
organizations. In this article, we focus on other arrangements – specifically those that are led by 
corporations, NGOs or sub-national units of government such as cities (Bulkeley, Andonova, 
Betsill, Hale, Hoffmann, Newell, Paterson, Roger, and Vandeveer 2014; Hale and Roger 2014). 
We call these transnational climate governance (TCG) (Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2007; 
Green 2014; Hale and Rogers 2014). Why do such actors use their resources to build TCG rather 
than focussing on promoting change at the domestic level?1 Our argument is that they do so 
when this is a more efficient way of using their limited resources than lobbying for action at the 
national level to increase domestic regulation. We highlight that the more legislative action there 
has been at domestic level, the greater the participation of actors in TCG. This is because if they 
can bank on the domestic legislative environment being favourable to their interest in climate 
change governance, organizations are less resource-constrained in relation to participating in 
TCG. 
                                                 
1 Herein for brevity we drop the “sub/non state” prefix. 
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Currently we lack a firm understanding of the domestic conditions that influence participation in 
transnational ties. Andonova (2014) provides a number of answers to another important question: 
what factors condition TCG arrangements where states do play an important leadership or 
conditioning role. Her specific focus is on arrangements arising from the Johannesburg Earth 
Summit, not all of which specifically concern climate change. Hale and Roger (2014) focus on 
transnational governance of climate change, but specifically on arrangements led by states 
(comprising around 30% of the total). The pioneering study of domestic influences using large-n 
statistical methods is that of Andonova, Hale and Roger (2015). They suggest that when 
governments hold pro-environmental views, this facilitates organizations’ involvement in TCG. 
They find some evidence that pro-environmental policies promote organizations’ involvement 
and quite strong evidence that state capacity does so. We build on this study by providing a 
strong theoretical rationale for the idea that a favourable domestic regulatory environment 
encourages participation. 
In addition to introducing a new measure for domestic climate change policy capturing the 
number of relevant domestic legislative instruments, we make three core contributions. First we 
use a rational agent perspective to develop specific hypotheses about domestic influences on 
action. This approach has proven extremely useful, alongside others, in constructing descriptive 
narratives about TCG (Bulkeley et al. 2014; Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009). For instance, 
Green (2014) uses a rational choice supply/demand model to develop hypotheses about why 
states delegate authority to private actors in some instances while private organizations develop 
‘entrepreneurial authority’ in others. Our argument complements Green’s. First we add that 
domestic legislative action can, in some circumstances, provide similar benefits to international 
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cooperation between states – and to private authority. Second we stress that organizations face 
trade-offs in pursuing goals associated with climate governance because they have finite 
resources.   
Our second contribution is to bring a network perspective to bear on the study of TCG. Although 
TCG has been widely cast in the literature, and even defined as, a network phenomenon 
(Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2009), surprisingly little use has been made of concepts from 
social network analysis and associated methods that are now becoming widely used in political 
science (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery 2009; Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011), and are 
starting to be used in the global environmental politics literature (Ward 2006; Cao and Prakash 
2010 and 2102; Kalbhenn 2011, Spilker 2012; Ward and Cao 2012; Schaffer and Bernauer 2014; 
Grundig and Ward 2015; Böhmelt and Vollenweider  2015). We add to the small number of 
studies in the recent literature using formal social network analysis. Lee and van de Meene 
(2012) study the directed network formed when one city involved in the C40Cities TCG program 
learns off another affiliated city. Green (2013) uses social network analysis to examine links 
when one greenhouse gas emissions standard recognizes another, enabling her to analyse which 
standards are central to this network. Widerberg (2014) moves beyond enumerating 
organizations involved in the climate regime complex (Keohane and Victor 2011; Abbott 2012) 
to map links between them, using affiliation to institutions and hyperlinks on organizations’ 
websites to other organizations. There is growing recognition in social network theory that it is 
often inappropriate to treat network ties as givens when they actually emerge from the strategic 
choices of agents (Jackson 2008:257-319). By considering the domestic factors that influence 
networks built by rational actors, we start to endogenise the network.  
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Our third contribution is to recognize that, in testing models of how networks develop, it is 
important to recognize that observations are not independent and to use appropriate econometric 
methods to deal with this. Looking at network ties helps us to answer our question about the 
effects of domestic legislation on organizations’ participation in transnational arrangements. 
However, care needs to be exercised in making statistical inferences. Several organizations in 
states j and k may be involved in negotiating an arrangement. If negotiations are successful, to 
use the language of social network theory (Wasserman and Faust 1994), a co-affiliation link is 
created between j and k. If, as will frequently be true empirically, organizations in some other 
state, i, are involved, network links are also created between j and i and between k and i. This is a 
‘friend of your friend is likely to be your friend’ effect. Notice that this implies that the 
probability of a tie between j and k is unlikely to be independent of the occurrence of other links 
in the network involving j, k and third states. If such interdependencies are not taken into account 
we are liable to get biased estimates of the effects of domestic covariates, as detailed in the 
section on latent-space models (Hoff, Raftery and Handcock 2002). 
TCG as a Network Phenomenon 
When organizations in countries i and j are involved in a TCG arrangement, they strengthen the 
network tie between the two countries. Our paper is different from others in this special issue in 
that our empirical focus is on explaining the strength of such network ties, based on our model of 
the trade-off that individual organizations face. The network is only strengthened if an actor in 
country i and an actor in country j are willing to participate in an arrangement. Thus we argue 
that the overall strength of the network tie (allowing for multiple organizations on each side) 
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6 
increases with the degree of development of legislation in the country that has the lowest level of 
domestic legislative action. This is a ‘weakest link’ argument (Hirshleifer 1983); it is the 
incentives of the actors most loath to participate that govern connections.2 Thus we adopt a 
rational agent perspective but, in line with a systemic approach to TCG (Bulkeley et. al. 2014), 
we emphasise that ties between countries are an emergent consequence of rational action of 
individual actors. 
At first sight to focus on network ties between countries rather than network ties between 
particular actors may seem a rather odd perspective, albeit that our argument derives from a 
theory of the domestic influences on organizations. However, transnational ties do more than 
link the agents explicitly involved in them. They create ties between countries, and second-order 
links between agents within them, along which information and normative influences flow. 
Although we do not deal in depth with information and influence flows in this paper, their 
potential importance helps to justify our research question.  Even relatively functionally diffuse 
ties of this sort may play a role in promoting sustainability (Ward 2006). As conduits for 
information flows between societies they may also lead to policy diffusion (Simmons, Dobbin, 
                                                 
2 Hirshleifer’s (1983) is an argument about public goods provision. Effective transnational 
climate governance is a public good, but it production often also co-generates private good 
benefits for participants, for example,  profits from participation in markets for carbon offsets. 
For applications of weakest link arguments to democratic peace and international conflict, see 
Dixon (1993) and Oneal and Russett (1997).   
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and Garrett 2006) and even to subsequent convergence of environmental policy between 
societies (Holzinger, Knill and Sommerer 2008). 
In this regard it is important to note that one characteristic form of TCG involves information 
exchange. Indeed Bulkeley et al. (2014) calculate that 90% of the sixty TCG arrangements they 
look at perform this function; and, furthermore, nearly the same proportion function to build 
capacity.3 For instance, an important focus for TCG has been networks between cities (Bulkeley 
2010; Lee and van de Meene 2012). Between 2008 and 2010 the World E onomic Forum’s 
SlimCity programme allowed city mayors and businesses to exchange information about using 
energy efficiently at city level (World Economic Forum 2009). The mayor of San Francisco and 
the Governor of Rio de Janeiro were both involved in this initiative. Each may have learned from 
the other about how to use energy efficiently. But they were also enmeshed in regional and 
national networks at domestic level. For instance San Francisco is also a member of the US 
Mayor’s Climate Protection Agreement. Information mayors learned through SlimCity can be 
passed on through these domestic networks, even though many actors in these domestic networks 
are not directly involved in Slimcity. Moreover what mayors know and can transmit directly to 
other actors involved in SlimCity is partly a function of the information they receive through 
domestic networks. Also when cities network internationally, they create opportunities for their 
                                                 
3 As shown in the introduction to this special issue Figure 2, the proportion of arrangements 
mapped in the data we use providing information and networking services fell from around 75% 
in 1990 to around 30% in 2010 (Roger, Hale and Andonova nd.). However, the proportion is still 
substantial.   
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mayors and officers to act as policy and norm entrepreneurs (Bulkeley 2010). Cities learn from 
each other directly by participating in networks (Lee and van de Meene 2012). In addition, cities’ 
involvement in TCG generates second-order links between business communities and citizens’ 
groups in cities, even if they are not directly linked; and it creates second-order links with cities 
not directly involved in TCG. 
Domestic lobbying activity can be costly in terms of time and money spent gathering 
information, maintaining personal ties and making contributions to politicians’ election funds. 
Participation in TCG is not cost-free, either. Information exchange requires time and effort to 
package information for others and to assimilate information the organization receives. Because 
they can informationally benefit some actors which do not bear the costs of TCG arrangements, 
the links we emphasise have the public-goods property of non-excludability. Nevertheless, it 
may be rational for organizations to use resources in building them because only participants get 
access to certain benefits, such as direct or enhanced access to information.  
According to Bulkeley et al (2014) some 50% of the TCG arrangements they looked at 
functioned to set standards. Like information exchange, adhering to a standard also has 
opportunity costs, because standards preclude potentially profitable activities.4 Standard-setting 
                                                 
4 Additional costs for involvement in transnational networks involve the allocation of 
administrative staff and resource for participation, meeting commitments, and/or resources 
toward increasing capacity for action.  
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also creates links between countries.5 As Potoski and Prakash (2005) argue, corporations 
adhering to a credible environmental standard enjoy reputational benefits with customers, 
suppliers and government regulators that they can only get by joining the ‘green club’. If a 
corporation in country i voluntarily offsets some of its carbon emissions against schemes 
accredited by, say, The Gold Standard, this can have a network externality effect on corporations 
in country j, increasing the value they place on offsetting. There is what Ostrom (2012) calls a 
nested externality: in this case, action at trans-governmental scale creates an externality linking 
national markets. 
Theory 
Focussing on transnational ties enables us to ask whether organizations develop transnational 
arrangements partly because this is a rational course of action for them given the degree of 
development of national policy in the country where they are based, and given the transaction 
costs associated with forging links with other organizations. It is a commonplace that 
corporations make rational use of resources so as to achieve desired ends; and the same 
assumption can be argued to be plausible for NGOs and sub-national governments. Resource 
mobilization theories of social movements suggest that NGOs have endemic problems with 
mobilizing their latent support, and must use resources wisely to maintain support and flows of 
resources from members (Edwards and McCarthy 2004). An important motive for local 
                                                 
5 In 2010 around 44% of TCG arrangements concerned standard setting and commitments 
(Roger, Hale and Andonova 2017). 
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politicians is to win elections by making rational choices over the policies and taxes they offer 
(Besley and Case 1995). We assume organizations make rational decisions about forming 
transnational ties. 
The literature suggests that organizations pursue a number of purposes through TCG: 
information sharing; rule setting; provision of collective goods; financial functions; capacity 
building and implementation (Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2007). Governance arrangements 
‘purposively steer constituent members to act’ (Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2007: 5). 
Regulation by states through domestic policy can aim to do the same thing, though sometimes 
through different means. For instance, cities concerned with their carbon emissions could lobby 
their government to set (binding or non-binding) targets for cities, or they could act to set up a 
TCG arrangement like C40Cities (Lee and van de Meene 2012) to encourage action through 
sharing of information. Similarly NGOs and corporations concerned about the low quality of 
some carbon offsets could have lobbied for state regulation of the domestic market rather than 
initiating a transnational arrangement.6 We assume that there is usually at least some overlap 
between what organizations can get through transnational arrangements and what they can get 
through lobbying to tighten domestic regulation, though we concede that this may not always be 
the case. This does not commit us to the view that organizations see lobbying and building 
transnational governance as equally efficient responses. For instance national regulation of 
carbon offsets might well be viewed as relatively inefficient by domestic interests because the 
                                                 
6 Green (2017) shows that some governments’ domestic legislation recognizes private offset 
standards, often alongside national standards. Again this suggests a degree of substitutability. 
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standard would only apply to one market. 7 We allow for organizations’ perceptions of relative 
efficiency via their utility function over national policy and transnational activity. 
On the assumption that TCG and domestic regulation are partial substitutes, organizations face a 
trade-off between them, because they face a resource constraint. Let the utility function of 
organization o in country j’s be 
            U(p, t, p∑) 
where p is the level of national policy, t is o’s level of transnational activity, and p∑ is the level 
of policy in the rest of the world outside j. (We simplify notation by dropping subscripts o and j.) 
Then we assume: 
              δU/δp > 0; δU/δt > 0; δU/δp∑ > 0; δ2U/δp2 < 0; δ2U/δt2 < 0; and δ2U/δp∑2 < 0 
i.e. o’s utility increases with the level of domestic and international policy and its transnational 
activity, but marginal utilities are declining.  
Because climate change is a global problem that cannot be solved by action at national level in 
any one country, it can be assumed that all organizations have some concern about what happens 
in other national jurisdictions. Nevertheless we expect their degree of concern to vary. A mayor 
may want to share information with mayors in other cities, but if her motives primarily centre on 
re-election, she may not be particularly concerned with outcomes in cities overseas – unless her 
                                                 
7 Although, if the country was economically powerful enough, it might diffuse through the 
‘California Effect’ whereby foreign corporations comply to gain better access (Vogel 1995). 
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voters are, too. If she could obtain the same information more easily at domestic level, it might 
well be rational to do so. On the other hand, the supporters of many environmental NGOs are 
strongly internationalist in outlook; so their leaders have (or must act as if they have) inherent 
concern for outcomes overseas.   We expect the marginal rate of substitution between domestic 
policy and transnational action 8 to vary systematically across different types of organization. 
Figure 1 shows three of o’s indifference curves for fixed p∑ in (p , t) space, labelled I1, I2 and I3. 
The more o cares about transnational action compared to domestic policy the flatter the 
indifference curve through a particular point. 
                                                         (Figure 1 here) 
Let the level of policy in country j if o does not lobby be pe. Suppose that o spends l units of 
resource on lobbying. Then we assume that the level of policy becomes: 
             p = pe +  l/π 
where π > 0 represents the costs of lobbying. Pushing policy forward is not costless because o 
faces resistance from a counter-lobby that could consist of domestic producers of fossil fuels, 
heavy industrial users of energy, or government departments primarily concerned with 
competitiveness or (narrowly defined) economic development.   The greater the power of the 
counter lobby, the larger the value of π. In general there could be strategic interdependence 
between o and other organizations. We assume that organization o does not expect others to 
react. This may be reasonable where large numbers of others are involved in an arrangement, so 
                                                 
8 Equal to (δU/δp)/( δU/δt) > 0. 
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that it is difficult for organizations to carry out a strategic analysis. Following the trend towards 
using game theory in the recent literature on environmental political economy (e.g. Bechtel and 
Urpelainen 2014), in the online appendix, a preliminary analysis suggests that our main 
argument generalizes if there are complementarities, so when oi puts more effort into TCG, the 
marginal benefit oj gets from investing in TCG increases. 
We assume that o cannot affect policy in the rest of the world directly. If it can do so at all, it 
does so indirectly through its transnational governance activities, for instance by helping to 
‘boomerang’ back global civil society’s views on the government of one of its transnational 
partners (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This is an idealization, because groups can and do affect 
policy outside their domestic system, even if costs are typically higher. Our central arguments 
generalise if we relax this assumption, however. 
If o expends t units of resource on transnational activity, its involvement is t/τ, τ > 0. One factor 
affecting the efficiency of such activity is transaction costs with organizations in other 
jurisdictions, τ. As these go up, we expect τ to increase. 
Organization o faces a resource constraint: 
                 l + t ≤ r 
Using dotted lines figure 1 shows o’s feasibility frontier in (p , t) space for three different levels 
of current domestic policy, pe’, pe”, and pe”’. Organization o gets pe units of public policy even if 
it expends no resources on lobbying. It can increase the level of public policy up to pe + r/π by 
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expending all its resources on lobbying. 9 On the other hand if it expends nothing on lobbing it 
can afford r/τ units of transnational activity. The downward sloping portion of the feasibility 
frontier has slope – π/τ. As pe increases the frontier expands outward, as shown. 
Organization o has a resource income r. However, this is not its only source. In formal terms pe is 
analogous to a portion of consumer income that must be spent and, moreover, must be spent on 
one particular good. As o’s ‘income’ (in this sense) goes up, its optimal mix of domestic 
lobbying and building transnational governance will change. As in standard consumer theory, 
optima are points of tangency between the feasibility frontier and indifference curves. We make 
the further assumption that both transnational action and domestic policy are normal goods, with 
positive income elasticity of demand. Then as o’s ‘income’ from existing domestic policy goes 
up, it choses more transnational action, as shown in figure 1: as domestic policy increases from 
pe’ through pe” to pe”’, o’s transnational activity goes up from t’ through t”, to t”’. Because o has 
fixed disposable income r, all of which it spends, domestic lobbying goes down from (r – t’/τ), 
through (r – t”/τ) to (r - t”’/τ).10 
Because this is a critical assumption in our model, it is worth pausing to think about why the 
feasibility frontier could expand outwards with the current level of domestic policy, pe. First this 
                                                 
9 As we assume that o cannot affect the level of p∑, it would be irrational to spend resources on 
lobbying outside its jurisdiction. 
10 Note that o still enjoys a higher level of domestic policy the greater its ‘income’ (consistent 
with policy being a normal good) even though it lobbies less. 
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would be so if domestic legislation can partially substitute for international governance and there 
is some degree of institutional ‘stickiness’ in policy. If organizations had continually to defend 
the status-quo level of regulation, they would be unable to ‘bank’ on it when deploying their 
resources elsewhere. However, we think that it is generally the case that it is harder to change the 
legislative equilibrium than to defend a status-quo policy once it is in place, as theories of 
punctuated equilibria in policy making suggest (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). While there are examples of governments rolling back climate change 
regulation, we do not think this is common so far. 
Moreover domestic legislation may free resources in less obvious ways, too. From the 
perspective of new institutional economics the transaction costs of investing in a common 
language, exchange of information, and trust are crucial to explaining the form taken by 
institutions. Applying this insight to transnational advocacy coalitions, Prakash and Gugerty 
(2010) argue that they will emerge in areas where there is considerable uncertainty and high 
costs to learning, so that up-front investment costs are high. Although domestic legislation may 
not directly substitute for transnational governance, it may reduce transaction costs for 
organizations under its jurisdiction, for instance by providing a common perceptual frame and a 
degree of trust at the domestic level between organizations from the country concerned that helps 
when they get involved in a transnational  initiative. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of changing the marginal rate of substitution, other things equal. As 
transnational governance becomes more important to the organization, indifference curves 
becomes flatter (I2 instead of I1) and the organization chooses more transnational activity (t” 
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instead of t’) and less lobbying. For instance, an international NGO might have the flatter curve 
I2 compared with a local politician more concerned with domestic politics. 
                                                   (Figure 2 here) 
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of increasing the price of domestic lobbying, π, other things equal. 
The maximum domestic policy that can be attained falls, and the sloping portion of the budget 
constraint becomes steeper. The price of domestic lobbying might go up if, for example, the size 
of the domestic carbon lobby was large, as is the case in the US and Russia. As policy is a 
normal good, the organization carries out less lobbying, resulting in a lower level of domestic 
policy. The effect on transnational action is indeterminate: the relative price of lobbying 
increases, encouraging more transnational activity (the substitution effect); but the increased 
price of lobbying reduces o’s income, which tends to reduce transnational activity (the income 
effect); the sum of these effects could be positive or negative. 11 
                                                   (Figure 3 here) 
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of decreasing the price of transnational action, τ, other things equal. 
For instance, such action may be less costly for an NGO already heavily involved at the 
international level than for a city that has largely operated at the domestic level to date. This time 
more transnational action is chosen in equilibrium, but the effect on domestic lobbying is also 
indeterminate. 
                                                 
11 In figure 3 the income effect predominates and transnational action decreases. 
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                                                   (Figure 4 here) 
In summary, our key theoretical expectations at the organizational level of analysis can be 
summarized as follows: 
I. The greater the level of current national policy output, the more effort o will put into 
creating transnational ties, other things equal; 
II. The greater the priority o puts on transnational payoffs, the more effort it will put into 
creating transnational ties, other things equal; 
III. The lower the transaction costs for dealing outside its national base, the more effort o will 
put into creating transnational ties, other things equal. 
We return to these points in our development of hypotheses. 
From the individual organization to the state-dyadic level: weakest links                      
Now we move from the micro-level of the incentives facing individual transnational agents to the 
national and dyadic levels at which ties between countries exist. The tie between countries i and j 
is strengthened when an organization from i and an organization from j both join an arrangement. 
Thus we focus on the organization with the smaller incentive to join. Note that the patterns of 
domestic incentives we focus on are common to all organizations in a particular country.  
Our dependent variable is the number of transnational links between countries i and j in the 
transnational governance network, i.e. the number of arrangements that have at least one 
organization in i and at least one organization in j as a member. To use terminology from 
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network theory, we model the value of the edge between i and j in a non-directed graph 
representing co-affiliation (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In modelling this we use a weakest-link 
argument.     
An arrangement links i and j only if it includes at least one organization from each country. First, 
a link could be forged when organizations from i and j agree with others to initiate an 
arrangement. No link is created between i and j if either organisation prefers not to go ahead.12 
The probability of a potential co-affiliation tie increases as the incentives of the organisation 
most loath to go ahead in i and j increase.  Second, an organization o from j, say, may or may not 
decide to join an existing organization. Again what governs whether a link is forged between i 
and j is how loath o is the join. In developing testable implications we focus on national-level 
factors governing this rather than the idiosyncratic ones characterizing particular organizations, 
which are difficult to capture empirically. Thus: 
H1: The value of the transnational link between i and j will increase with the level of 
development of national policy in the member of the dyad with the least-developed national 
policy to combat climate change (in line with point i on the summary of the previous section). 
A strong domestic environmental constituency correlates positively and significantly with 
national participation in public-private partnerships for sustainability (Andonova 2014). We 
assume that environmental NGOs have a strong support constituency for international action; 
                                                 
12 Negotiations in relation to the same arrangement could continue between other dyads, but even 
if they succeed, no link is created between oi and oj. 
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hence they place considerable emphasis on transnational payoffs. In addition pressure from 
environmental NGOs may increase the incentives of other organizations like cities to become 
involved in transnational arrangement (Dolšak and Prakash nd). Then: 
H2: The value of the transnational link between i and j should increase with the number of 
environmental NGOs in the member of the dyad with the lowest number of environmental NGOs 
(in line with point ii above). 
      Although, consistent with the emphasis of this special issue, our main focus is on domestic 
politics, international factors enter via transaction costs. These should go up with the 
geographical distance between i and j. We also assume that transaction costs for negotiating 
transnational arrangements are lowered by trade ties between i and j. In line with classic liberal 
arguments, Dorussen and Ward 2010 find that conflict between countries falls with both direct 
and indirect ties in the trade network, the importance of indirect ties, especially, suggesting that 
this partly relates to information flows. If organisations know more about each other’s societies 
and values, it should be easier to reach agreement. So (in line with point iii) above): 
H3: The value of the transnational link between i and j should decrease with the distance 
between them and; 
H4: The value of the transnational link between i and j should increase with dyadic trade 
between i and j. 
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Data 
Shared TCGs:  Our dependent variable is the shared number of TCGs between two countries 
during the 1990 and 2013 period. We use data discussed in Roger, Hale and Andonova (nd.). We 
exclude ‘orchestrated’ transnational climate governance arrangements where a state or IGO has 
played an important role. The data gives starting dates and ending dates for arrangements, from 
1990 onwards. Most came into operation after 2000. All but about 10% were still extant in 2013. 
However, the data set does not provide the time a country joined and/or left a TCG, but only 
whether it was part of TCG during the period 1990 onwards. As is impossible for us to create 
yearly cross-sections, we treat the data as a single cross-section. We then use the country-level 
data to calculate a co-affiliation network where the value of the edge between country i and 
country j is the number of arrangements which came into operation between 1990 and 2013 
having one or more member organizations in both i and j. 
Figure 5 is a visual representation of the network. The closer countries are in the figure the more 
ties there are between them; and the larger the font size used for a county’s acronym, the more 
arrangements it has entered in total.13 The figure brings out the fact that ties are predominantly 
between rich developed countries themselves, and between rich developed countries and newly 
emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil. Moreover, there is clustering such as a large 
European bloc in the lower right, a Scandinavian bloc to the right of them, a US, Canada, and 
                                                 
13 For clarity, we do not draw edges for values ≤ 5. Many countries are not involved in global 
TCG networks.  
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Australia bloc, and a China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa block. Note that there are 135 
countries in this figure, but only 70 of them are included in the latent space model analysis 
because of missing data on the right-hand side variables.14 Table A5 of the online appendix lists 
the countries, their acronyms and whether they are included in the empirical analysis. 
                                          (Figure 5 about here) 
Key Explanatory Variables: Four salient factors affect the chances of a link existing between two 
countries via TCG: a) the shared number of TCGs between two countries should increase with 
the level of development of national policy, the number of domestic environmental NGOs, and 
the density of trade between the two countries; b) it should decrease with the distance between 
the two countries. Following the discussion above, we use the weakest link approach to create 
the dyadic version of these variables.          
Our measure of national policy is drawn from the IEA/IRENA global renewable energy policies 
and measures database.15 This gives information on national policies under the following broad 
headings: economic instruments; information and education; policy support; regulatory 
instruments; research and development; and voluntary approaches.  The date each policy came 
into force and ended is given. Our base measure of national policy, domestic legislation, is the 
number of listed policies and measures that were in force at some time during the period 1990-
                                                 
14 The variable most responsible for this is the domestic legislation variable: only about 100 
countries are included in the data set.   
15 See http://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/.  
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2013. For dyad i, j we take the lower of the national values. Other empirical studies of TCG have 
used a general Environmental Performance Index (Andonova, Hale and Roger 2014; Hsueh nd.) 
or particulate air pollution (Andonova, Hale and Roger 2014) as proxies for national policy on 
climate change. Our measure is more closely related to climate change, although it does not 
directly capture carbon taxes (Ward and Cao 2012) and energy conservation policy.16 
We measure the number of environmental NGOs (green NGOs) by the average number of 
environmental NGOs registered in a country with the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) between 1990 and 2006 (Bernauer et al. 2013). We also take the lower of the 
national values. To capture general trade network ties between countries, we started with 
Gleditsch’s (2002) trade data, taking the average level of bilateral trade measured in real terms 
for the period 1990 to 2000. Because of missing values in the bilateral trade data, we then 
estimated a gravity model of trade, calibrated using Gleditsch’s data, and used this to create a 
                                                 
16 Adopted policies could be numerous but not particularly strong. One reason is that energy 
intensive groups might be able to block a strong policy by agreeing to a number of less 
significant policies. Ideally one should code the strength of each domestic policy; but this is hard 
to operationalize across countries. A country’s environmental treaty commitment often strongly 
correlates with its domestic efforts (Cao and Prakash 2012); green taxes are can be considered a 
strong policy because they often affect energy intensive sectors directly. Our domestic policy 
variable gains some credibility from correlating with the total number environmental treaties 
variable at 0.49 and with per capital green taxes variable at 0.24.  
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proxy for total dyadic trade, trade proxy. 17 For the effects of distance in geography, we use 
Gleditsch and Ward’s (2001) minimum distance data (distance). This records the shortest 
distance between points on the outer boundaries for two polities, as long as the shortest distance 
is less than 950 kilometers. 
Control Variables:18 Although our theory predicts that the size of the counter-lobby will reduce 
the amount of domestic lobbying by an organization (point iii above), it suggests the effects on 
transnational involvement are indeterminate. Nevertheless, the theory leads us to expect some 
effect, so it is important to control for this possibility. A number of factors may be cited that 
could increase the power of the counter lobby. For instance it is likely to go up as the number of 
domestic veto-players increase, because this increases the chances that one veto will be opposed 
to further domestic legislation, increasing its price. However, specifically we contend that the 
domestic fossil-fuel production industry is likely to be opposed. Hence our measure of the size of 
the counter-lobby against extending national policy is fossil fuel production – a country’s oil, 
gas, and coal production per capita, measured in millions of tons of oil equivalent for 1990-2005 
(Bättig and Bernauer 2009). For each dyad, we take the lower of the national values. 
                                                 
17 A gravity model specifies that dyadic trade increases with the size of each economy and 
decreases with the distance between them. For an application to international conflict see Hegre, 
Oneal and Russett (2010). Results do not change between using the actual bilateral trade and the 
imputed trade proxy variable. 
18 Unless we note another source, data are from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
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In order to control for the effect of trade openness, we create trade share – the share of total 
trade in GDP, based on trade proxy variable, for the dyad member with the smallest share. We 
use two variables to control for a country’s environmental conditions: CCI is the climate 
vulnerability index (Guillaumont and Simonet 2011) and CO2 pc is CO2 emissions per capita. 
Similarly, we follow the weakest link approach to create the dyadic version of the variables. 
Because many TCGs surround carbon trading, it is important to control for the size of a 
country’s financial sector, as some financial organizations may have an interest. However, it is 
quite difficult to find a convincing proxy. Because of wider data availability, ultimately we used 
bank deposits per GDP – bank deposits normalized by GDP for the dyad member with the 
smallest financial sector.19 Because the corporate sector’s interest in environmental issues may 
affect a country’s TCG involvement, we control for the number of ISO14001 certificates 
normalized by the size of GDP. As suggested by Andonova, Hale and Roger’s study (2014) we 
include measures of democracy and decentralization: polity is the democracy score of the 
country with the lower level democracy within a dyad on the 21-point Polity IV scale (Marshall, 
Jaggers and Gurr 2011); federa ion is a federalism dummy variable indicating whether both 
countries are federal states. EU is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if both countries are 
EU member states. Finally, we also control for the effects of real GDP per capita and population 
size, also following the weakest link approach. Wealth is often associated environmental values, 
therefore increasing the level of environmental demand from the citizens, part of which might be 
                                                 
19 The bank deposit variable might be problematic because, for instance, not all financial 
institutions are involved in carbon trading.  
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translated into transnational actions.  A large country, by its sheer size of the economy and 
connections with other countries , might have a higher chance of forming TCG ties.20    
Latent Space Model 
Justification: The dependent variable of this study belongs to the relational (“dyadic”) data-type, 
which consists of measurements that are made on pairs of objects or under pairs of conditions. 
Statistical modelling of relational data often poses a challenge to standard statistical models 
which assume independence among observations. Inter-dependencies among dyadic observations 
are prevalent in most relational data (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock 
2002). This concern is relevant for this study because of the possibility of autocorrelation among 
dyadic observations of the dependent variable: the shared numbers of transnational arrangements 
are likely to be highly correlated between dyads of countries. For example, if Germany shares 
many ties with France, and France shares many with Italy, it is very likely that Germany shares a 
large number of ties with Italy (unless the ties shared between Germany and France and the ties 
shared between France and Italy do not overlap). This kind of autocorrelation between dyadic 
observations is often called “third-order dependence” in the statistical literature. Ignoring third-
order dependence in dyadic data and treating dyads Germany-France, France-Italy, and 
Germany-Italy as independent observations can cause bias in parameter estimates (Hoff 2005). 
                                                 
20 We provide a detailed discussion of the effects of control variables in the online appendix.  
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The statistical literature has proposed a series of latent space to control for autocorrelation among 
dyadic observations (Hoff, Raftery, and Handcock 2002; Hoff 2005). Countries' unobserved 
characteristics are captured by latent vectors: e.g., we can use two latent vectors, ݖ௜ and ݖ௝, to 
locate countries in  i and j in the latent space, capturing third-order dependence (autocorrelation) 
in the dyadic observations of transnational ties among them. The latent space model has recently 
been applied in the political science literature, but it has mainly been used to model actual flows 
such as trade and migration (Ward and Hoff 2007; Breunig, Cao, and Luedtke 2012; Cao and 
Ward 2014). In this study, we use the following latent space model: 
y୧,୨ = βᇱୢ ݔ௜,௝ + ܽ௜ + ௝ܾ + ߳௜,௝ + ݖ௜ᇱݖ௝              
where y୧,୨ is the number of transnational ties between country i and j,21 βᇱୢ ݔ௜,௝	represents 
covariates (e.g., domestic legislation, green NGOs, size of domestic energy sector, and dyadic 
trade volume), and ܽ௜	and ௝ܾ 	the country random effects. ߳௜,௝ is a normally distributed random 
error. Therefore, without the cross product of latent vectors (ݖ௜ᇱݖ௝), y୧,୨ = βᇱୢ ݔ௜,௝ + ܽ௜ + ௝ܾ + ߳௜,௝	is 
a typical random effects regression setup with a dyadic dependent variable. 
The cross product of latent vectors of i and j --- ݖ௜ᇱݖ௝ are added to control for third-order 
dependence/autocorrelation in dyadic observations of the dependent variable (y୧,୨'s).22 Note that 
                                                 
21 We use a Poisson link function. 
22 The dimensionality of the latent vectors can be chosen depending on the purpose of the model: 
if the goal is descriptive, then a choice of k = 1, 2 or 3 would allow for a simple graphical 
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we have not exhausted all potentially relevant variables (for example, common culture between 
two countries). However, the latent space model controls for these by country random effects 
(ܽ௜	and ௝ܾ) and the cross-product of countries' latent positions (ݖ௜ᇱݖ௝). The former (ܽ௜	and ௝ܾ) 
control for domestic variables and the latter (ݖ௜ᇱݖ௝) can be considered as taking up the 
unexplained interactive/dyadic effects.23 
Empirical Results: Table 1 summarizes the posterior distributions of the effects of covariates and 
the variances of country random effects, random error, and the three latent dimensions. We 
include density plots to show the 95% confidence intervals (by blue vertical lines) in Figure 6. 
We are first of all interested in whether the four variables implied by our theories affect chances 
of TCG ties between countries. We italicize these four variables in Table 1:  Trade proxy, 
Distance, Domestic legislation, and Green NGOs. Specifically, Table 1 shows the lower and 
upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals, the mean, and the standard deviation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
presentation; alternatively, one could examine model fit as a function of k based on the log-
likelihood, or use a cross-validation criterion if one is primarily concerned with predictive 
performance. See Hoff 2005. The goal for this paper is to control for higher-order dependencies. 
Log-likelihoods suggest that model fits better when k=2 or 3; to be consistent, we set k=3. 
Results when setting k=2 are in the second model specification of Table A2 of the online 
appendix.  
23 The latent positions and the latent space model are estimated by Bayesian Markov chain 
Monte Carlo. Empirical Bayes priors are used.   
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posterior distributions. Here, we find no evidence that the level of bilateral trade affects TCG 
participation (H4 is not suported). The distance between countries also has no effect on their 
shared TCGs (H3 is not supported). These two non-results seem to suggest that transaction costs 
for organizations to deal with organizations outside its national base hardly affects their TCG 
efforts. 
                                                     (Table 1 here) 
On the other hand, we find domestic legislations and domestic green NGOs are both positively 
associated with shared TCGs between countries (H1 and H2 are supported). This confirms our 
central theoretical claim that TCG links between two countries increase with the level of 
development of national policy, and our subsidiary claim that the strength of domestic support 
constituency for international action matters. In terms of the substantive effects, holding all 
variables at their mean levels, the mean predicted TCG between any two countries is about 0.75 
(mean of a Poisson distribution); if we increase the value of the domestic legislation variable by 
one standard deviation, that is, from a mean of 2.03 to about 4.29, the mean predicted between-
country TCGs increases by about 5.5% (to 0.79); moreover, a two standard deviation increase in 
the domestic legislation variable increases the mean predicted between-country TCGs by about 
11%. The substantive effect of the domestic green NGOs variable is smaller but still not 
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negligible: here a one standard deviation increase from the mean increases the mean predicted 
TCGs by about 3.4% and a two standard deviation increase by about 7%.24  
                                      (Figure 6 and Table 2 here) 
                                                    
In addition to the aforementioned four variables, we include a number of controls. Looking at 
Table 1 and Figure 6, few of them matter for TCG connections between countries. However, we 
do find that countries with higher level of trade to GDP share (trade openness) are associated 
with more links, suggesting that countries that are more open economically also have 
organizations more proactive in relation to building transnational climate governance. Moreover, 
we also find that real GDP per capita matters as wealthier countries are associated with higher 
number of links. 
The size of the counter lobby is of particular interest because our theory suggests that it should 
matter, although the direction of the relationship is not predicted. Looking at both Table 1 and 
Figure 6, we also see no evidence that the size of domestic counter lobby, measured by  a 
                                                 
24 Our predicted substantive effects are calculated only using covariates, that is, βᇱୢ x୧,୨ in 
y୧,୨ = βᇱୢ x୧,୨ + a୧ + b୨ + ϵ୧,୨ + z୧ᇱz୨; a careful reading of Table 1 suggests that there is significant 
amount of variance not explained by the covariates (βᇱୢ x୧,୨); actually the variance of country 
Random Effects (σ2a) is relatively large with the estimated mean around 4.28, suggesting country 
random effects (a୧ + b୨) explain quite a significant amount of variation in the DV.  
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country’s oil, gas, and coal production per capita, affects the number of TCGs shared by two 
countries. In order to assess robustness, we also use another indicator: fossil fuel energy 
consumption a percentage of total energy consumption. The results are presented among 
robustness checks in Table 2. Table 2 shows the lower and upper bounds of both the 90% and 
95% confidence intervals. Here, we also find no association between the importance of fossil 
fuel energy consumption and TCG network links.  
Insitutional constraints at the domestic level may inhibit both domestic and transnational action; 
so as a robustness check we add Henisz’ (2002) widely-used measure of  domestic  veto players. 
25 We substitute a specific measure of civil liberties for our more general measure of democracy 
(polity), as freedom of expression and association may be more crucial for the green lobby than 
free elections in which green parties have little success.26 Interestingly, we find neither of these 
variables affects TCGs links, even at lower levels of significance. In Table 2, H1 is still 
supported, but  we do find that the green NGO variable is now only significant at the 90% level; 
so support for H2 is somewhat weaker.                     
  
                                                 
25 We use the country scores averaged over the 1990 and 2004 period. 
26 Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. Data are provided 
by the Freedom House. Countries are graded between 1 (most free) and 7 (least free).  We used 
the country scores averaged over 1990-2008.  
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Conclusions 
Our theory suggests that, dependent on characteristics of the weakest link in the dyad, the 
number of network ties between two countries should increase with domestic legislation (H1), 
the number of domestic environmental NGOs (H2), and the density of trade between the two 
countries (H4). It should decrease with the distance between the two countries (H3). We find that 
H1 and (somewhat more weakly) H2 are supported. Few other domestic covariates are 
significant, though ties are greater if the weakest link is richer and a more open economy. 
Neither vulnerability to climate change nor CO2 production per-capita matters, so ties appear not 
to be driven by the seriousness of climate change as an issue for the weakest link. While ties 
appear to be promoted by a powerful domestic green lobby (H2), there is no evidence that a 
bigger financial sector (that might benefit from carbon trading) or more firms adopting voluntary 
environmental management standards matter. Moreover, there is no evidence that the size of the 
carbon counter-lobby matters. While it is gratifying that we find the anticipated effects of 
domestic legislation using a more direct indicator, there is clearly considerably more work to do 
in developing theory.          
          Our approach could be developed in a number of ways. We highlight that involvement in 
TCG is linked with the ability to exert pressure, so that domestic lobbying relates to international 
governance. Because of this, domestic institutional variables found to be important in the 
comparative political economy literature should relate to TCG: majoritarian versus proportional 
representation; presidential versus parliamentary; and the nature of the party system (Persson and 
Tabellini 2005) or corporatism (Scruggs 2003). We argue that transnational ties do more than 
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link the organizations directly involved. They are conduits through which information can flow 
between countries, linking organisations not directly involved in TCG. As such, they present the 
possibility of diffusion of policy and learning. In further research the TCG network discussed in 
this paper could be used to study policy diffusion by employing the spatial lag methods that have 
recently found application in the international environmental politics literature (Ward and Cao 
2012).  Another question suggested by our emphasis on the relation between TCG and domestic 
politics is whether domestic policy outputs are made more effective in terms of their impact on 
carbon-emissions by involvement in TCG networks. For instance does centrality in the TCG 
network condition effectiveness? 
             We find ties are strongest between rich countries and between rich countries and some 
NICs (Bulkeley et al. 2014:117-133). In relation to rich countries, ties are denser between 
countries with developed national climate change legislation and strong environmental 
movements. If it turns out the network does promote information transfer and diffusion, on the 
one hand it tends most strongly to link countries most responsible for greenhouse gas emissions. 
On the other it may not function so well to link developed countries and poorer ones which are 
peripheral to the network. In other words, the current network structure of the global TCG 
network might not help the information flows between the rich and poor countries as much as we 
would like to see. 
         While recognizing the role that states can play in forging governance arrangements over 
climate change, the literature sees governance by non-state actors as an important complement to 
international regimes and state-led governance networks. Flexibility mechanisms under the 
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Kyoto Protocol encourage the involvement of a range of non-state actors; and the weakness of 
the regime encourages the formation of ‘coalitions of the willing’ from ‘outside’ the regime 
(Andonova, Betsill and Bulkeley 2007:4). On the other hand there are serious concerns about 
weak governance of carbon markets that have emerged under the Kyoto Protocol (Newell and 
Paterson 2010:141-160) and about the need to develop new accountability mechanisms 
(Keohane 2006). Different forms of accountability mechanisms (Bäckstrand 2008) and different 
bases of legitimacy (Bulkeley et al. 2014:134-157) may be appropriate for different sorts of TCG 
arrangements; and some accountability mechanisms could involve corporations or governments, 
rather than civil society or citizens as a whole. However, Lidskog and Elander (2010) argue that 
addressing climate change in a democratic and efficient manner requires greater integration 
between the climate change regime, built by states, and TCG. We suggest this implies greater 
grass-roots and citizen involvement. De Búrca, Keohane and Sabel (2014; see also Stevenson 
and Dryzek 2012) propose ‘global experimentalist governance’, which implies continual review 
of both international and transnational governance through a deliberative and inclusive process 
reaching down to citizens at grass-roots level, facilitating learning and reflection on the overall 
process of governance. In such a conception, adequate flows of information are crucial: 
otherwise, justification of practices through deliberation cannot function in a satisfactory 
manner. When a country is peripheral to the network we focus on, its government and citizens 
will receive relatively little information compared to those from a country central to the network. 
From this perspective transnational climate change governance is not open enough to 
deliberative justification – and it is certainly not open enough to justification to poor citizens in 
poor countries. The emergent network we study tends to exclude poor countries and, because of 
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this, TCG is less shaped by the preferences of their citizens. Therefore TCG may be less 
responsive to the very people who are most likely to suffer the negative consequences of climate 
change. 
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Table 1: summary of posterior distribution: the effects of covariates, error structures, and latent 
dimensions. 
 
 2.5% Mean 97.5% ̂σ 
 Constant -2.0345 -0.4579 0.5937 0.6566
Trade proxy -0.0009 0.0001 0.0009 0.0005
Distance -0.0104 -0.0026 0.0052 0.0040
Domestic legislation 0.0014 0.0235 0.0432 0.0104
Energy production -0.0179 0.0018 0.0195 0.0096
Green NGOs 0.0003 0.0103 0.0205 0.0052
Trade share 0.0147 0.0526 0.0902 0.0191
Real GDP per capita 0.0048 0.0119 0.0185 0.0034
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Polity -0.0184 0.0040 0.0245 0.0109
CCI -1.0621 -0.1742 0.7523 0.4591
CO2 pc -0.0123 0.0097 0.0319 0.0116
EU -0.0640 0.1333 0.3225 0.0963
Bank deposits per GDP -0.1698 0.0406 0.2482 0.1078
Federation -0.0212 0.1235 0.2641 0.0732
Population -0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002
ISO14000 per GDP -0.0127 0.0137 0.0381 0.0134
Variance of Country Random Effects (σ2a) 
1.5067 4.2789 11.6405 3.0839
Error Variance (σ2γ) 
0.0059 0.0083 0.0112 0.0013
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Variance of Latent Dimensions 1 (σ2z1) 
0.2630 0.3914 0.5882 0.0836
Variance of Latent Dimensions 2 (σ2z2) 
0.0228 0.0630 0.1427 0.0329
Variance of Latent Dimensions 3 (σ2z3) 
0.0188 0.0405 0.0977 0.0195
 Log Likelihood (L-L) -2979.10 -2950.17 -2918.43 15.53
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Table 2:  Latent space model estimates for shared TCGs: robustness checks. 
 
 2.5% 5% Mean 95% 97.5% ̂σ 
 Constant -2.1547 -1.8188 -0.5569 0.4433 0.6298 0.7025 
Trade proxy -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0008 0.0010 0.0005 
Distance -0.0107 -0.0094 -0.0028 0.0041 0.0051 0.0041 
Domestic legislation 0.0033 0.0064 0.0236 0.0405 0.0432 0.0103 
Fossil fuel (% of total energy) -0.0036 -0.0030 0.0009 0.0049 0.0057 0.0023 
Green NGOs -0.0001 0.0020 0.0101 0.0179 0.0196 0.0050 
Trade share 0.0137 0.0194 0.0513 0.0823 0.0886 0.0189 
Real GDP per capita 0.0043 0.0054 0.0113 0.0171 0.0179 0.0035 
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Civil liberty -0.0846 -0.0697 -0.0009 0.0653 0.0792 0.0414 
Veto player -0.2676 -0.1911 0.2242 0.6015 0.6898 0.2434 
CCI -1.0834 -0.9495 -0.1877 0.5300 0.6873 0.4525 
CO2 pc -0.0137 -0.0099 0.0087 0.0274 0.0302 0.0114 
EU -0.0587 -0.0207 0.1377 0.2894 0.3190 0.0939 
Bank deposits per GDP -0.1872 -0.1383 0.0386 0.2196 0.2424 0.1101 
Federation -0.0165 0.0016 0.1185 0.2324 0.2488 0.0714 
Population -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 
ISO14000 per GDP -0.0140 -0.0087 0.0128 0.0349 0.0399 0.0134 
 Variance of Country Random Effects (σ2a)
1.5460 1.6584 4.3811 10.7956 12.2195 3.2100 
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Error Variance (σ2γ) 
0.0060 0.0062 0.0083 0.0107 0.0113 0.0014 
Variance of Latent Dimensions 1 (σ2z1) 
0.2604 0.2771 0.3900 0.5307 0.5663 0.0785 
Variance of Latent Dimensions 2 (σ2z2) 
0.0231 0.0256 0.0572 0.1154 0.1317 0.0290 
Variance of Latent Dimensions 3 (σ2z3) 
0.0198 0.0220 0.0469 0.1043 0.1227 0.0259 
 Log Likelihood (L-L) -
2977.67
-
2974.14
-
2950.89
-
2924.94 
-
2920.96 
14.89 
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Figure 1: The effect of increasing domestic policy on transnational activity. 
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Figure 2: The effect of increasing emphasis on transnational issues in the utility function. 
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Figure 3: The effect of increasing the price of domestic lobbying. 
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Figure 4: The effect of decreasing the price of transnational action. 
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Figure 5: The transnational governance network between countries. 
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Figure 6: density plots of posterior distributions of the effects of 15 covariates. Note we indicate 
the 95% confidence intervals by dashed vertical lines and add solid vertical lines to indicate 
zeros. One way to evaluate the statistical significance level is whether the 95% confidence 
intervals bounded blue vertical lines include zero or not.  
 
 
 
